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Abstract
WASSERMAN, JOSHUA Accurately Simulating the Battle of Thermopylae to Analyze “What-If”
Scenarios. Department of Computer Science, May, 2017.
ADVISOR: Valerie Barr and Hans-Friedrich Mueller
The Battle of Thermopylae (480 BCE) was a last ditch effort to stall the Persian army as it marched
south toward Athens. Led by Leonidas and his personal guard of 300 Spartans, a citizen army of Greeks
was able to delay a Persian army of over 100,000 soldiers at the town of Thermopylae for several days.
Although the Greeks were ultimately defeated at Thermopylae, the battle provided enough time for the
Greek states to regroup and plan a counter attack, eventually defeating the invading Persians. This battle
was crucial not only for the preservation of Greek independence, but also the first democratic society. But
how, against all odds, did the small Greek force withstand the Persians for as long as they did? What might
have happened had key factors and choices been slightly different? By modeling the battle with historical
accuracy, we can simulate various counter-factual scenarios to determine which factors were crucial for
the Greeks’ incredible achievement.
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1 Introduction
The Battle of Thermopylae, 480 BCE, is regarded as one of the most iconic battles in ancient history. The
battle is most notable for the unbelievable resilience shown by a few thousand Greek soldiers in the face of
certain death. Their foe, the Persians, had over 100,000 soldiers in their army and were advancing south,
toward Athens, with the goal of destroying the Greek state.1 Although they were ultimately defeated, the
Greeks were able to stall the Persians at Thermopylae for three days, giving the Greeks enough time to
evacuate Athens and plan a counter attack, ultimately pushing the Persians out of Greece. In doing so, the
Greeks protected the Athenian democracy, preserving it for future civilizations.
In retrospect, there is absolutely no doubt about the important role that this battle had on the course of
history. However, this acknowledgement does not help to explain how significant the specific circumstances
of the battle were to this outcome. For centuries, scholars produced countless hypotheses and theories
that claimed to explain the details of this battle and other historical events. But, they were restrained
by the lack of knowledge on the subject since Herodotus’s account of the battle remains its sole primary
source. As a result, there was a very small amount of new knowledge being discovered about the battle and
other historical subjects, as most scholars made simple speculations or wildly unsupported conclusions.
However, a sudden interest in the ancient world over the last century spurred a new wave of scholarship
that uses modern technology as a means to discover new information about these important events.
With the onset of modern archaeology at the end of the 19th century, the study of ancient history was
introduced to the scientific method.2 For the first time in over a millennium, scholars began to search for
the remnants of ancient history, using ancient authors like Herodotus and Homer as their guides. With
the discovery of these ancient sites, new sources of knowledge were finally unearthed. These discoveries
led to a major shift in the study of ancient history, as scholars could compare archaeological evidence with
the historical records. Saturated by an overwhelming amount of scholarship, this new wave of interest
in historical analysis slowly subsided. Suddenly, the discipline reached a new intellectual horizon that
resulted in the publication of more wild theories and unsupported conclusions. This time, scholars tried
to link archaeological discoveries with historical records but could not provide any evidence to prove that
their conclusions were accurate. They lacked an important link between these two sources that made it
impossible to conclude, with complete certainty, anything pertaining to the way the ancient world worked
or the accuracy of the historical record.
However, Peter Turchin, a professor from the University of Connecticut, believed that he could solve
this issue by using analytic models generated by computer simulations in an interdisciplinary field he
1Herodotus. The Histories. Trans. by Tom Holland and Paul Cartledge. New York: Penguin Group, 2014, 7.60.
2William H. Stiebing. Uncovering the Past. A History of Archaeology. Oxford University Press, 1994.
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called Cliodynamics.3 Believing that truly understanding the present requires an understanding of the past,
Turchin began to study and analyze history using complex simulations. These simulations modeled the
interactions between individual agents as a means to uncover the factors that led to the rise and fall of
great civilizations.4 Using Turchin’s method, unsupported theories can be tested and analyzed, leading to
important conclusions that may unveil new historical knowledge. This approach has been used to conduct
research in a variety of interesting studies: from explaining the settlement patterns of the Incan Empire
around Lake Titicaca in South America,5 to populating the Roman Colosseum with virtual crowds.6
Motivated by these cliodynamic methods, I developed a simulation of the Battle of Thermopylae that I
used to analyze “What-if” scenarios. By developing a historical model that produced historically accurate
simulation results, I could confidently simulate counter-factual scenarios that altered the specific circum-
stances of the battle. Analyzing the differences between the results of these counter-factual simulations and
the historical simulations revealed the significant impact these details had on the outcome of the battle.
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Cliodynamics
This interdisciplinary approach to analyzing history originated with the concept of cliodynamics, developed
by Peter Turchin at the University of Connecticut.7 Turchin argues that although we put forth a massive
amount of resources into research that will strengthen and fix our sickly society, we are inherently disad-
vantaged by our lack of understanding of how we came to be sick in the first place. He proposes that it is
time to treat history as “an analytic, and even predictive, science,” and suggests that we pursue the new
interdisciplinary field of cliodynamics. This discipline marries the study of history with the social sciences
in order to develop theories that explain, with an analytic perspective, why and how a society developed
certain problems. By testing these theories using historical data and analytical techniques, we can make
conclusions about the origins of society’s greatest problems and begin to develop ways to correct them.
In one of his most recent publications, Turchin8 studied the completeness of theories that ”explain the
emergence of large-scale societies.” They realized that a problem with many of these theories was that they
failed to explain how societies dealt with other cooperative groups. Additionally, most of these theories are
3Peter Turchin. “Arise ’cliodynamics’”. In: Nature: International Weekly Journal of Science 454 (2008).
4Peter Turchin et al. “War, space, and the evolution of Old World complex societies”. In: Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the United States of America 110 (2013).
5Arthur Griffin and Charles Stanish. “An Agent-based Model of Prehistoric Settlement Patterns and Political Consolidation in the
Lake Titicaca Basin of Peru and Bolivia”. In: Structure and Dynamics: eJournal of Anthropological and Related Sciences 2.2 (2007), p. 49.
6Diego Gutierrez et al. “AI and virtual crowds: Populating the Colosseum”. In: Journal of Cultural Heritage 8 (2007).
7Turchin, “Arise ’cliodynamics’”.
8Turchin et al., “War, space, and the evolution of Old World complex societies”.
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Figure 1: Models A,C, and E represent the actual distribution of large communities in Afro-eurasia between
1500 BCE and 1500 CE. Models B, D, and F, are those made from the agent-based simulation.
verbal, leading to models that are non-explicit and barely proven. Turchin set out to test these theories with
models made from agent-based simulations. This agent-based solution turned the proposed theory into a
quantitative model. The result, as seen in Figure 1, was proof that their simulation was accurate. The simu-
lation produced a model that predicted the distribution of large societies that was incredibly similar to the
historical distribution. Using this simulator as the foundation, Turchin et al. proved that their distribution
theory produced models that accurately generated the actual, historical distribution a significant portion of
the time. They concluded that their results were an important step in developing the world of analytical
history.
2.2 Using artificial intelligence in virtual environments
In a recent study, autonomous agents were used to simulate crowds populating the Roman Colosseum.9
They argue that by using artificial intelligence in a historically accurate virtual environment, scholars are
able to make conclusions about unknown details of history. This is made possible because of the predictive
power of this type of autonomous simulation in a virtual environment. The simulation was built using a 3-
dimensional model of the Colosseum from a different study. In order to populate this 3-dimensional virtual
9Gutierrez et al., “AI and virtual crowds: Populating the Colosseum”.
3
reconstruction they needed to create intelligent crowds that could interact with this environment. They
built an artificial intelligence system that was “not deterministic,” meaning that its results are not scripted.
By creating virtual agents with a sophisticated basic structure, Gutierrez et al. were able to build crowds
that had senses, intelligence, knowledge, perception, goals, and predefined behaviors. Using a motor, these
individual agents could act appropriately within the environment.10 With so many possible behaviors, the
agents used a finite state machine which defined the appropriate behaviors for every possible state. A finite
state machine uses a series of sensors to receive environmental data, the interpretation of which changes the
state to correspond with the current environment.11 This finite state system organizes the agent’s actions
into generic behavioral groups, allowing them to act autonomously within the bounds of the program.
With all of these components working together, crowds of artificially intelligent agents are able to interact
with the virtual environment freely, generating unpredictable results. Analyzing these results can lead to
new insight and logical conclusions about how people interacted with these historical environments.
3 The History
By the early 5th century BCE, the Persian Empire, under King Darius I (r.522-486 BCE), controlled the
territory between the Persian Gulf and modern day Greece (Figure 2).12 As the empire expanded, Greeks
living in newly occupied territories in Asia Minor were given the opportunity to submit to the Persians
without consequence. This meant accepting Persian appointed tyrants as local leaders, economic blockades
and a loss of liberty.13 Many small city-states had no choice but to give in to Darius’s demands. In some
cases, however, the Greeks opted to resist the occupation. In Lydia, a coastal region of Asia Minor, many
Greeks opposed Persian rule and planned to revolt. Unfortunately, a large portion of Lydians did not
support the movement and the Persian army easily maintained control of the region. Several years later,
Lydians had come to hate their Persian leaders and again planned a revolution. This time, they requested
support from the mainland Greeks. In response, the Athenians sent soldiers and supplies to aid in the
revolt. The Ionian Revolution, as it is now called, started in 499 BCE. With Athenian aid, the Ionian army
defeated the Persians in Asia Minor with ease. However, once Darius learned of his defeat, he ordered his
entire army to retake their lost territory and set his sights on mainland Greece.14
After unsuccessfully extending his offer of peaceful surrender to the mainland Greeks, Darius and his
10Gutierrez et al., “AI and virtual crowds: Populating the Colosseum”, p. 9.
11Ulrich Nehmzow. Mobile Robotics. A Practical Introduction. 2nd ed. Springer-Verlag London, 2003.
12Adrian Bivar and Mark J. Dresden. “Ancient Iran”. In: Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica, inc., 2009. URL: https:
//www.britannica.com/place/ancient-Iran.
13Ernle Bradford. Thermopylae. The Battle for the West. Open Road Media, 2014, p. 34.
14Nic Fields and Steve Noon. Thermopylae 480 BC: Last Stand of the 300. Campaign. Osprey Publishing, 2007, p. 9.
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Figure 2: The extent of the Achaemenid (Persian) Empire circa 500 BCE.
https://www.britannica.com/place/ancient-Iran
army set sail across the Aegean Sea. Aware of Darius’s intentions, the Athenians and their allies prepared
to fight near the town of Marathon. Here, in 490 BCE, the Persian army disembarked their ships and were
quickly dispatched by the Greek army. After their defeat at the Battle of Marathon, the Persians retreated
back across the Aegean Sea.15 For 10 years, the Greeks celebrated their unlikely victory by erecting huge
monuments dedicated to their gods. During this same period, however, the Persian Empire underwent
massive changes when King Darius I died and his successor, Xerxes, again set his sights on Greece. Learning
from Darius’s mistakes, Xerxes planned to accompany his navy with a ground invasion. With over 100,000
soldiers in their army, the Persians marched into Greece with minimal resistance. Aware that Xerxes would
quickly make his way to Athens, the Greeks had no choice but to stall the invasion in order to evacuate
major cities, regroup, and devise a plan of action. The Greeks determined that the only way they could
slow the Persians’ swift march was to confront the Persian army on two fronts: by sea, at Artemisium, and
by land, at Thermopylae (Figure 3).16
3.1 The Battle of Thermopylae
The Greek army sent to Thermopylae was led by the Spartan King Leonidas. Although Sparta had between
8,000 and 10,00017 battle-ready soldiers at its disposal, the call to arms coincided with the Festival of Apollo
Carnea, the celebration of the third moon of Fall. As religious people, the Spartans were not allowed to
participate in battle during the festival.18 However, to support the Greek cause and inspire their allies to
15Fields and Noon, Thermopylae 480 BC: Last Stand of the 300, p. 10.
16United States Military Academy, West Point. Atlas for Ancient Warfare: The Battle of Thermopylae. URL: http://www.usma.edu/
history/SitePages/AncientWarfare.
17Herodotus, The Histories, 7.234.
18Herodotus, The Histories, 7.206.
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Figure 3: The locations of the Battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium. Map from the Department of History
at the United States Military Academy, West Point.
join the war effort, the Spartans sent Leonidas and 300 hand-picked soldiers as an advance guard to Ther-
mopylae. Herodotus mentions that although the rest of the Spartan army would march to Thermopylae
after the festival, the soldiers who accompanied Leonidas were decidedly those who had already produced
male heirs in case they died before the main army arrived.19
As the Spartan advance guard marched toward Thermopylae, they were joined by soldiers from neigh-
boring city-states who had also answered the call to arms. By the time Leonidas arrived at Thermopylae,
his advanced guard had grown to roughly 5,200 soldiers from all over Greece.20 However, the Greeks were
still at a significant disadvantage as, according to Herodotus, Xerxes had an army of more than two million
soldiers.21 Although modern scholars speculate about the accuracy of this claim suggesting that the army
was at most 100,000 strong, the point remains the same.22 Maximizing the effectiveness of his small force,
Leonidas set up a defensive position at a place known as the “Middle Gate” in the region of Thermopy-
lae (Figure 4).23 Here, the coastal road passed through a natural bottle neck that was only 15 meters wide,
flanked by steep mountain cliffs to the south and the sea to the north. By the Greeks defending this narrow
section of the pass, the Persians would be forced to use smaller waves of soldiers against the powerful
Greek phalanx, nullifying their immediate strength in number.24 However, the Middle Gate had one major
19Herodotus, The Histories, 7.205.
20Herodotus, The Histories, 7.202.
21Herodotus, The Histories, 7.60.
22Fields and Noon, Thermopylae 480 BC: Last Stand of the 300, p. 55.
23Tom Holland. Persian Fire. The First World Empire and the Battle for the West. Anchor Books, 2005, p. 222.
24Holland, Persian Fire, p. 212.
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Figure 4: The “Middle Gate” and hidden path through the mountains. Holland, Persian Fire, p. 222.
weakness: a hidden path through the mountains that met the main road behind the Greek position. When
he had been informed about this flaw by locals, Leonidas sent a contingent of 1,000 Phocians from his army
to guard the path.25
When the Persian army finally arrived, Xerxes sent a scout to investigate the Greeks. When the scout
arrived at the Greeks’ position, he saw only a few Spartan men bathing and relaxing, as was customary be-
fore battle. He informed Xerxes of the state of the Greek army and the unnatural sight he had encountered.
However, one of Xerxes’s trusted advisors warned the king that the Spartan hoplites should not be taken
at face value, as they were widely regarded as the greatest soldiers in all of Greece.26 Nevertheless, Xerxes
remained unswayed by this news and believed that the Greek army would surely retreat at the sight of his
much larger force. After four days of waiting, however, to Xerxes’s dismay, the Greeks showed no signs of
leaving. So, on the morning of the fifth day, Xerxes began his assault.27
The early Persian waves were composed of Medes who had been new additions to the Persian army.
Trained to fight in rough terrain using their overwhelming numbers to overpower the enemy, they were
unprepared to fight the Greeks in the close quarters of the Middle Gate’s bottleneck.28 Herodotus ex-
plains,“The Medes fell upon the Greeks in a great rush, and although many were slain, others still pressed
25Fields and Noon, Thermopylae 480 BC: Last Stand of the 300, p. 62.
26Herodotus, The Histories, 7.209.
27Herodotus, The Histories, 7.210.
28Fields and Noon, Thermopylae 480 BC: Last Stand of the 300, p. 45.
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the attack, and were not driven back, despite terrible losses.”29 In the early stages of the battle, to their
surprise, the Persians were unable to penetrate the Greeks’ defensive position. As Leonidas had intended,
the narrow path forced the Persians to break formation and fight in conditions for which they had not been
trained.30 The Greeks capitalized on this natural bottleneck by employing the phalanx formation to great ef-
fect. As a result, when the Persians arrived at the Greek position, they were met by an impenetrable wall of
spears and shields. As fighting continued, the phalanx would push against the waves of Persians, inflicting
heavy damage. In some cases, the Spartan contingent of the Greek army would fein a retreat, inciting the
Persians to pursue them. When they did, the Spartans would turn, reforming their phalanx and inflicting
massive casualties.31,32
At around midday, Herodotus recalls, “such was the mauling inflicted on the Medes that they were
withdrawn from the attack, and replaced by the Persian ‘Immortals’... and who, it was expected, would
have no difficulty completing the task.”33 However, these more elite soldiers had similarly poor results,
and were also withdrawn. On the second day, Xerxes continued to expect his army would easily defeat the
Greeks. Surely, he believed, the small Greek army would show signs of fatigue from the first day and would
be easily beaten. However, since the Greeks consistently substituted weary soldiers with fresh ones, they
did not show signs of fatigue. Thus, the results of the second day were quite similar to the first. Infuriated
by the results, Xerxes withdrew his forces early to consider alternative strategies.34
As he pondered how to defeat the resilient Greek army, Xerxes was approached by a local Greek farmer
named Ephialtes.35 Ephialtes advised the Persian king that he should send a portion of his army on a secret
path through the mountains to flank the Greeks. Heeding the farmer’s suggestion, Xerxes ordered his
Immortals accordingly.36 Early in the morning of the third day, Greek scouts noticed this maneuver and
notified Leonidas. When the Greek regional leaders realized that they would be surrounded by the end
of the day, many opted to retreat. The Spartans, who were taught to welcome death, remained with the
Thebans and Thespians as a rear guard. Though they would surely die, those who stayed were determined
to defend their allies’ retreat.37
Aware that they were going to die, the Greeks defiantly advanced beyond their original position into
a much wider section of the pass. Here, at “the time in the morning when market-squares fill up”,38 the
29Herodotus, The Histories, 7.210.
30Holland, Persian Fire, p. 212.
31Herodotus, The Histories, 7.211.
32Fields and Noon, Thermopylae 480 BC: Last Stand of the 300, pp. 65-66.
33Herodotus, The Histories, 7.211.
34Herodotus, The Histories, 7.212.
35Holland, Persian Fire, p. 220.
36Herodotus, The Histories, 7.213.
37Herodotus, The Histories, 7.222.
38Herodotus, The Histories, 7.223.
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Greeks met the Persians in brutal combat. Herodotus describes:
The Greeks, you see, because they knew that they were going to die at the hands of the men
coming round the mountain, did all they could to demonstrate to the Barbarians the full force of
their strength, and fought in a frenzy, without regard for their lives. Now, by this stage, because
most of them had smashed their spears to splinters, they were using their swords to slaughter
the Persians.39
As the fighting intensified, Leonidas was slain. Once they had recovered his body, the remaining Greeks
withdrew to a small hill behind their original position. They were met on one side by the main Persian
army and on the other, by the flanking Immortals. Here, the Greek held their final stand until each man
was slain.40
3.2 Arms and Armor
The Greek army that fought at the Battle of Thermopylae was composed of citizen-soldiers from various
regions of Greece. Since the average city-state, or polis, could not afford a standing army, wealthy citizens
would buy their own weapons and armor and double as soldiers when necessary. However, as farmers and
artisans, these citizen-soldiers lacked significant military training. As a result, they equipped “themselves
as hoplites, heavily armored infantry who fought shoulder to shoulder in a large formation known as a
phalanx.”41 This system was implemented by nearly every city-state in Greece, with one famous exception:
the city-state known as Lacedaemon, or, more commonly, Sparta. Located in the southern plains of the
Peloponnese, Sparta favored a militaristic community over the common agrarian system. Unlike other
Greeks, Spartans began military training at a very young age. Over a period of roughly 14 years, these
young boys were put through grueling tests of strength and endurance, which transformed them into the
greatest fighting force in ancient history.42 Herodotus praises the Spartans, saying, “The Lacedaemonians
fought in a manner that richly merits description, and left no one in any doubt that, while they were men
who really knew what they were about, their opponents were just amateurs.”43 Similarly armed as hoplites,
the Spartans were clearly the only professional soldiers to fight at the Battle of Thermopylae.
Historically, hoplites wore Corinthian style helmets formed from a single sheet of either bronze or iron
that protected the entire head, neck, and face (Figure 5). Inside the helmet, an inner lining made from
leather added extra padding, dampening the effects of a blow to the head. The Corinthian helmet, which
39Herodotus, The Histories, 7.224.
40Herodotus, The Histories, 7.225.
41Fields and Noon, Thermopylae 480 BC: Last Stand of the 300, p. 22.
42Bradford, Thermopylae, p. 46.
43Herodotus, The Histories, 7.211.
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Figure 5: A Corinthian helmet on display at the Archaeological Museum of Olympia in Olympia, Greece.
Photo by Josh Wasserman.
became a symbol of ancient warfare, gained recognition for its iconic shape and the plume of horse hair
that decorated its crest.44 The hoplite’s torso was completely covered by a metal and leather corselet that
extended to the top of the knee. Below the waist however, the corselet was cut into thin strips that afforded
the same protection without limiting the soldier’s movement. Lastly, metal greaves, specifically molded for
the wearer, were strapped around the calf on both legs to protect the foot and shin.45,46
Perhaps the most significant piece of equipment the hoplite carried was the shield. On average, the
shield measured three feet in diameter. Made with a sturdy wooden core covered and reinforced by ham-
mered bronze, the round shield could deflect the strongest of attacks (Figure 6). As a result, the hoplite
employed the shield with great effect in their dominant phalanx formation.47 In the phalanx, hoplites stood
shoulder to shoulder such that the shield carried in their left arm would cover the right side of the soldier
at their side. Locking their shields together in this manner, formed an impenetrable wall of armor.48 Often
several lines deep, the formation easily maintained its integrity as soldiers could readily reinforce weak
portions of the wall. Hoplites also carried six foot spears in their right hand that protruded through spaces
in the shield wall. Designed for optimal balance and durability, these iron tipped spears could be thrust
44Fields and Noon, Thermopylae 480 BC: Last Stand of the 300, p. 23.
45Bradford, Thermopylae, p. 57.
46Fields and Noon, Thermopylae 480 BC: Last Stand of the 300, p. 24.
47Bradford, Thermopylae, p. 55.
48Fields and Noon, Thermopylae 480 BC: Last Stand of the 300, p. 24.
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Figure 6: A Spartan hoplite shield on display at the Museum of the Ancient Agora in Athens, Greece. Photo
by Josh Wasserman.
with great accuracy and power, giving the phalanx a deadly range of nearly 8 feet.49 If enemies managed
to avoid the line of spears, however, hoplites could use their shields to shove them back. With their foe
off-balance, hoplites equipped with light curved short swords would emerge from behind their shields and
strike the enemy with deadly precision, only to return to safety behind their shields. This was the manner
in which most hoplites fought.50
Unlike the Greek hoplite, the Persian foot soldier was equipped to fight on rough terrain and wore com-
paratively light armor. Their outfit consisted of minimal cloth or leather clothing and, occasionally, a metal
helmet. They carried a light shield made of wicker and leather that was often shaped like a crescent or a
figure eight.51 The infantry was equipped with a variety of weapons including a short spear, a long double-
edged dagger and a light battle axe.52 Most importantly, however, the Persian infantry was equipped with
a composite bow and a quiver of short arrows with bronze or iron heads. This bow was a focal point of
the Persian strategy. In most situations, the Persian army would bombard the enemy with arrows, ideally
thinning the ranks before engaging in hand to hand combat with their minimal body armor. However, at
49Bradford, Thermopylae, p. 56.
50Bradford, Thermopylae, p. 57.
51Fields and Noon, Thermopylae 480 BC: Last Stand of the 300, p. 40.
52Fields and Noon, Thermopylae 480 BC: Last Stand of the 300, p. 37.
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the Battle of Thermopylae, the Greeks had positioned themselves in such a narrow section of the path that
arrows would have had little effect. Thus, the Persians’ only option was to charge directly into the Greek
phalanx. With lighter armor and shorter spears, the Persians were ill-prepared to take the Greeks head on,
as they were surely “easy prey for [the] wall of bronze-clad professional killers.”53
In addition to the basic infantry, the Persians relied on their heavily trained and individually selected
Immortals. The Immortals were known to be the best of the best in the Persian army, hand picked to
serve in the king’s guard. Justly called the ”Immortals”, this division of the Persian army was said to have
contained 10,000 soldiers. With so many soldiers at their disposal it would have seemed that they had
infinite reinforcements, or, in a sense, were immortal. However, it is evident that the Immortals merely
had power in number since they similarly wore light cloth and leather armor and carried light weapons.
Nevertheless their extensive training would have made them far superior to the typical foot soldier.54
4 The Simulation
The primary goal of this project was to produce an accurate model of the Battle of Thermopylae that could
subsequently be modified to generate counter-factual results. In order to complete this task, I needed
to develop a simulation that could test both the historical and counter-factual models. In designing this
simulation, the only requirement was that it be robust enough to handle multiple different models without
changing its core components. Over the course of the project, I approached this general requirement from
various angles.
4.1 Java and Unity
My initial vision for this project was to develop a graphically based, computer game - type simulation that
would show the interaction of individual autonomous agents replicating the battle. By using agents that
possessed some common form of artificial intelligence, individual soldiers could behave independently
of one another but also work well together as an army. In order to prove I could build a simulation of
this complexity I first had to develop a simple interaction between just two of these agents. I designed
this feature, dubbed “The Interaction” using the object-oriented programming language Java. With limited
knowledge of software design, however, my final design, Figure 7, repurposed some project materials
from CSC-260: Large-Scale Software Design. My previous work implemented a variety of different design
strategies that incorporated class inheritance and encapsulation: two properties that would make classes
53Holland, Persian Fire, p. 212.
54Fields and Noon, Thermopylae 480 BC: Last Stand of the 300, p. 41.
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more robust and reusable.
Figure 7: Class diagram of the simulation prototype.
The design for “The Interaction” had three main components, each individually responsible for a spe-
cific feature of the simulation to avoid having to share data across classes: Editor, Battleground, and Soldier.
The front end of the program, the visual component, was managed exclusively by the Editor class, initializ-
ing the simulation and running the Java applet. At the start of the simulation, the Editor would create a new
Battleground to store the simulation data and facilitate “The Interaction”. The Battleground would creates
the necessary Soldier objects to fill the simulation. The resulting prototype, Figure 8, produced text based
results that indicated the outcome of a fight between two soldiers.
Figure 8: The Java applet as it appeared during prototyping.
My next step was to implement more complex features, namely movement and primary autonomous
behaviors. However, after some trouble, I realized that Java did not have the correct tools to successfully
and efficiently add this functionality into the simulation. I would have had to teach the program to treat
soldiers as solid objects, sense and distinguish between hostile and friendly soldiers, give agents artificial
intelligence that allowed them to operate individually and then ensure that each of these elements could
run simultaneously. While Java is a very robust object-oriented programming language, implementing
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these components would have simply taken too much time.
I explored several game development tools that could potentially handle these increasingly complex
demands before I discovered the Unity game engine. This open-source game development environment
specializes in building cross-platform video games.55 With physics, motion and sensory features included
in the free version of the software, Unity provided all the necessary tools to pick up where my Java program
left off. With help from Unity’s massive online community, I was able to learn how to use this new envi-
ronment with relative ease. But, since Unity is not an object-oriented programming language like Java, my
original class-based design was no longer applicable. However, my original design, Figure 7, did divide
the program’s logic into distinct chunks that I could use to make the transition slightly easier. Fortunately,
many of the features in my Java prototype came as standard features of the Unity engine. This meant that
I did not have to reimplement any of the visual components in the EDITOR class. By the end of the first
term, I successfully implemented motion and sensory elements into “The Interaction”, Figure 9, leaving the
implementation of artificial intelligence and the historical model to the next development phase. Moving
into the second half of the project, however, it became evident that Unity would also struggle to scale easily
given the demanding nature of my simulation.
Figure 9: “The Interaction” as it appeared in Unity.
4.2 SimPy
In the end, I built my simulation in Python using the module SimPy, “a process-based discrete-event sim-
ulation framework.”56 The SimPy framework splits a simulation’s primary components into three distinct
functions: ENVIRONMENT, PROCESSES, and EVENTS. The ENVIRONMENT tracks the simulation time and
data, and stores its list of PROCESSES and EVENTS.57 These PROCESSES are used to define the model’s behav-
ior and execute the simulation. They do this by interacting with the ENVIRONMENT and other PROCESSES
55Unity Documentation. 5.5. Unity Technologies. Oct. 2005, p. 2.
56SimPy Documentation. 3.0.10. Team SimPy. Jan. 17, 2017, p. 1.
57SimPy Documentation, p. 10.
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using the EVENTS.58 By dividing key components into these three functions, the SimPy module provides
Python users with an easy and dynamic tool with which to build simulations with precisely scheduled
events and customizable model behaviors.
Choosing to develop the simulation using SimPy did, however, demand that I change my original de-
sign. In SimPy, my simulation would no longer focus on a visual representation of the battle. Instead, the
primary goal of my simulation was to generate quantitative results. This was an important realization. In
the first half of the project I had focused only on developing a graphical simulation of the battle without
considering how I would display any results. By switching to SimPy I realized that I had been too focused
on the appearance of the simulation and had not even considered that quantitative results would need to be
at its heart. Thus, the revised design for the simulation of the Battle of Thermopylae focused on producing
quantitative results from a historical model defined according to the historical record.
4.3 Developing the Simulation Environment
In theory, the simulation ENVIRONMENT should be the only component of the simulation that changes with
each counter-factual scenario. As a result, the historical model needs to be versatile and robust enough to
apply to every possible scenario regardless of simulation length. It just so happens that each battle scenario
accepts one important fact which I exploited to optimize the code’s reusability: they each abide by the
24 hour day. Although this may seem like a trivial observation, it actually substantially simplifies event
scheduling, a process which can easily lead to complex and redundant code. This is a direct result of the
simulation ENVIRONMENT tracking time as a counter rather than a proper clock.
In order to address this, I divided a 24-hour day into three EVENTS: morning, the period from midnight
to 7:00 a.m.; daytime, the period from 7:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. that contains all combat; night, the period from
8:00 p.m. to midnight (see Figure 10). To maintain the historical integrity of the simulation at this level,
the duration of these events were assigned according to the average length of an autumn day on the Greek
coast.59 Thus, together, these periods accurately lasted 1,440 units of simulated time, or 24-hours in minutes.
With the addition of a day counter, not only could I accurately schedule battle events to occur at specific
times, but I also could schedule them to specific days. This means that the simulation could run correctly
regardless of the simulation length or scenario. Without this design, for example, in order to schedule the
lunch event to occur precisely at noon each day, I would need to tell the program to process this event at
simulation times 720, 2160, 3600, etc. Eventually, when the simulation length is changed, hard coding the
schedule in this manner would become an issue since lunch would not be scheduled for the additional days.
58SimPy Documentation, pp. 3-4.
59Steffen Thorsen. Time and Date AS. URL: https://www.timeanddate.com/sun/greece/athens.
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However, with this design, I could easily schedule lunch to occur 300 minutes into the daytime event, which
is noon on the 24-hour clock. Following this design made the program more robust and reusable by hiding
the simulation length from the model.
Figure 10: Hierarchical day structure.
4.4 Building The Model
With the core event hierarchy built into the simulation environment, I could begin development on the
historical model. First, I created a timeline of key events and details from Herodotus’s account. Since SimPy
implements model behaviors using PROCESSES and EVENTS, I divided the elements of my timeline into two
groups: major and minor events. Major events only occurred once and represented important moments of
the battle. Minor events, on the other hand, were recurring and provided primary model behaviors. Thus,
major events were implemented into EVENT type functions so they could be scheduled precisely, while
the minor events were implemented as generic EVENT functions and PROCESSES. Since EVENTS employ
PROCESSES to define their behavior, I added the major events to the model first.
The first major battle event is “Mountain Defense”. Though this event technically took place prior to the
beginning of the battle, it is an event that alters the population of the Greek army making it too important to
omit. “Mountain Defense” simulates the Greeks’ decision to have the Phocians defend the mountain path,
removing them from the main army. The next major battle event, “Xerxes Withdraws”, occurred on the
second day and suspended fighting for the rest of the day as Xerxes did according to the historical record.60
The final major battle event, “Ephialtes’s Betrayal”61, initiated the battle events “Greek Retreat”62 and “Final
Stand”. Together, these battle events established the final stand sequence which occurred on the third day
60Herodotus, The Histories, 7.212.
61Herodotus, The Histories, 7.213.
62Herodotus, The Histories, 7.222.
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and resulted in the death of the remaining Greeks.63 By implementing major events first, I ensured that they
would not be able to directly alter the model’s core behavior, making them non-essential to the simulation’s
success.
Like their counterparts, the minor events highlight recurring actions taken during the battle. These in-
clude: Spartan fein retreat tactics, changes in the Greek formation, and Persian assaults. Since variations of
the minor events occurred several times throughout the battle, I implemented them as generic EVENT func-
tions that change behavior according to simulation time. In some cases however, these recurring events
happened at unspecified times and relied on implicit behaviors in order to function correctly. I imple-
mented these implicit behaviors as PROCESSES. This way, unscheduled events could be triggered once their
conditional processes are completed. The execution of events and processes and the interaction between
them affect the simulation by changing the value of specified variables in the simulation environment. In
order to apply these changes to generate a quantitative result, the model was initialized with historical
quantities from Herodotus’s primary account and scholarly secondary sources.
4.5 Historical Quantities
Initial army totals were originally taken directly from Herodotus. Research revealed, however, that many
scholars believe that Herodotus greatly exaggerated or miscalculated the size of the Persian army.64 These
sources suggest that the army was closer to 100,000 soldiers, not, as Herodotus claims, over 2,000,000.65
Although this figure is too high, for the purposes of the historical simulation, it can be assumed that the
Persian army was essentially infinite compared to the Greeks. Luckily, Herodotus cared far more about the
Greeks and provides a detailed list of the number of soldiers in their army and where they come from:
There were 300 hoplites from Sparta, and 1,000 altogether from Tegea and Mantinea, with 500
drawn from each, 120 from Arcadian Orchomenus, and 1,000 from the rest of Arcadia. In addi-
tion to the Arcadians, 400 came from Corinth, 200 from Phleious and 80 from Mycenae. These
were the contingents from the Peloponnese, while from Boeotia there were 700 Thespians and
400 Thebans. Swelling these numbers were the Locrians of Opous - who, when the call went
out, sent their entire fighting force - and 1,000 Phocians.66
He also recalls, in significant detail, the effect that Epialtes’ betrayal had on the Greeks. Herodotus states
that after some Greeks decided to retreat, “there remained with the Lacedaemonians only the Thespians
63Herodotus, The Histories, 7.223 - 226.
64Fields and Noon, Thermopylae 480 BC: Last Stand of the 300, p. 55.
65Herodotus, The Histories, 7.184.
66Herodotus, The Histories, 7.202-203.
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and the Thebans.”67 This information is easily translated for use in the simulation.
At this point, however, Herodotus is of little use. His account scarcely describes actual fighting and,
when it does, it lacks any real substance, as he tends to substitute empirical data with more flowery lan-
guage. As a result, a significant amount of research went into calculating the outcome of each violent
interaction. In the simulation, as in the battle, each period of combat lasts until the wave of Persian soldiers
was either completely destroyed or forced to retreat. Until this point, fighting would have been continuous
and deadly. Herodotus states, “The Medes fell upon the Greeks in a great rush, and although many were
slain, others still pressed the attack, and were not driven back, despite terrible losses.”68 Although he fails
to provide exact data, Herodotus does succeed in informing the reader about the pace of battle. He also
reports the results of these bloody conflicts by saying, “... there was no counting the number who fell.”69
Although Herodotus does not provide concrete information about the number of soldiers who died in these
epic fights, he does establish a relatively high expectation for the number of soldier who died during these
epic fights.
At the end of his account of the Battle of Thermopylae, Herodotus estimates that roughly 20,000 Per-
sians70 and 4,000 Greeks71 were killed over the three days. Importantly, however, Herodotus mentions that
this estimated figure of dead Greeks consisted of“exclusively Lacedaemonians and Thespians” but also a
group of helots. Since this is the first Herodotus mentions helots, Spartan slaves, my simulation does not
take them into account. Additionally, other sources suggest that the total number of dead, including the
roughly 900 helots, was closer to 2,300.72
4.6 Combat System
Unquestionably the most important process in the entire simulation was the combat system. This com-
ponent is solely responsible for simulating the results of battle, and without it, the simulation would not
produce any data. In order to properly develop this combat system, I had to understand every aspect of the
combat between the Persians and the Greeks. In accordance with the historical record, I scheduled combat
to occur during the daytime. Since the duration of combat was dependent on the population of the Persian
wave, I implemented the combat sequence so that it was not dependent on a strict schedule. As a result,
I programmed the combat sequence to run in one minute increments until the entire wave was either de-
stroyed or routed. Each simulated minute of combat would first accumulate relevant data on the current
67Herodotus, The Histories, 7.221.
68Herodotus, The Histories, 7.210.
69Herodotus, The Histories, 7.211.
70Herodotus, The Histories, 8.24.
71Herodotus, The Histories, 8.25.
72Bradford, Thermopylae, p. 115.
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state of the battlefield: specifically, the remaining wave population and the number of Persians and Greeks
engaged during that minute of combat. This information is then sent to a fight PROCESS that resolves inter-
actions between individual Persian soldiers and the Greeks. The fight process specifically iterates through
the population of engaged Persian soldiers because combat is conditionally determined by the state of the
Persian wave. Additionally, the result of a Persian’s interaction is necessarily binary, either the Persian or
Greek is killed; the reverse would need to account for the chance that a Greek does not fight or fights more
than once, resulting in more potential outcomes.
In order to resolve these individual interactions, I developed a combat system that accounted for the
variations in soldier quality and the relative randomness of battle. I implemented these factors using a
separate Soldier class. Each soldier object represented the entire population of an individual type of soldier.
At the Battle of Thermopylae, although there were many soldiers from various regions of the Mediterranean
world, I could narrow these populations down to just four distinct types of soldier. For the Greeks, Spartans
and citizen-soldiers, and for the Persians, Immortals and miscellaneous infantry. Each object required three
parameters which distinguished them from other soldiers: name, army and population. I used the “name”
parameter to easily reference soldier objects by name, “army” to indicate whether the soldier was Greek or
Persian, and “total population” to indicate the number of soldiers remaining. These soldier objects were
created at the beginning of the simulation and were assigned initial populations in accordance with their
historical quantities. Soldier objects carried a number of important variables that were consistently updated
to reflect the object’s current state or fighting ability. This fighting ability was split into attack and defense
skills and a number of state-dependent modifiers.
I determined a soldier’s attack and defense values based on the quality of their equipment and their
military skill relative to the other soldier types. For simplicity, I graded these traits separately on a 5 point
scale, then added the grades together to determine their value (Table 1) . To assess the quality of arms,
I based my grade on the information stated in the Arms and Armor section of this paper. These sources
allowed me to conclude that the arms and armor used by hoplites was consistently superior to that of the
Persians. In fact, Ernle Bradford, an expert on the ancient mediterranean world, confidently concludes that,
“Although [the Persians were] admirably equipped and trained for the type of warfare that they normally
encountered – for instance, in their recent action against Egypt – they were not a match for the heavily
armored Greek hoplite.”73 Additionally, as stated before, their arrows were likely too weak to penetrate
the hoplite armor and, in the bottleneck, too inaccurate to hit the Greeks. As a result, I gave hoplites the
highest rating, 5, and the standard Persian infantry the lowest, 1. Since Immortals wore armor slightly more
protective than the main infantry, they received an armor rating of 2.
73Bradford, Thermopylae, p. 58.
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The military skill attribute was ranked in a similar manner. Since the Spartans are still considered
amongst the greatest warriors in history, they were easily assigned the highest skill rating of 5. Setting
this standard, I easily assigned the Persian infantry the lowest possible rating. This decision was based on
two facts. First, as Bradford mentioned, the infantry training did not prepare them for fighting in level,
confined spaces. Secondly, having such a large army, the Persians prioritized quantity of soldiers over
quality, training their infantry to fight in large groups rather than individually. Since they were provided
some training I gave them an attack skill of 1, but, since they relied on number rather than skill I gave
them a 0 defense skill. I graded the Immortals using similar logic. These soldiers would have been quite
skilled as they were hand selected to serve in the kings guard. Like the infantry, however, Immortals used
their large numbers to their advantage. In fact, Immortals were so famous for this quantity-focused style
of fighting that their title, ’Immortal’, stemmed from the illusion that when a soldier was killed another
was there to take his place.74 Therefore I gave them an attack skill of 2 but a defense skill of 0, for they
too would have been ill prepared to fight at Thermopylae. Lastly, the citizen-soldiers that composed the
bulk of the Greek army were required to pay for their own military training. This training prepared these
citizen-soldiers to fight as hoplites. As a result, a large portion of their training taught them to rely on their
excellent equipment. Consequently, I afforded them a skill rank of 2 both in attack and defense.
Soldier Attack Defense
Spartan 9 9
Citizen-Soldier 7 7
Immortal 4 2
Persian Infantry 2 1
Table 1: Soldier attack and defense attribute values
Depending on the state of the battle or the condition of the soldier, however, a modifier is applied to the
attack and defense values. These modifiers account for factors which improve or detract from the soldier’s
fighting ability (Table 2). In accordance with the historical record, I created four modifiers for the Greeks
and only one for the Persians. When the Greeks are in a phalanx, their attack and defense is improved
by one and two points respectively. In the event that the formation is broken, the Greeks receive a Frenzy
modification that improves their attack by two points but reduces their defense by one. Herodotus mentions
that the Greeks fought even when they had destroyed their weapons, as a result I created a Broken Weapons
modifier that reduced their attack and defense by five. Lastly, when the Spartans use their fein retreat tactic
their attack is improved by two. The only modifier I created for the Persians improved their attack by two
when they were not forced to fight in the bottleneck, benefiting from their strength in number.
The second component of this system was the combat “roll”. Like the roll of the dice, this roll randomly
74Herodotus, The Histories, 7.83.
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Modifier Attack Defense Soldier Type
Phalanx +1 +2 Greek
Frenzy +2 +1 Greek
Broken Weapons -5 -5 Greek
Fake Retreat +2 N/A Spartan
Strength in Number +2 N/A Persian
Table 2: Soldier attribute modifiers
selects a value from a range of integers with equal probability. However, unlike the typical six-sided die,
the range of possible numbers generated by the combat die was equal to the attack or defense value. For
example, if a soldier had an attack value of 5, the attack roll would produce a random number between
0 and 5. In the simulation, a fight compares the result of one soldier’s attack roll with the result of the
opponent’s defense roll. The soldier with the higher roll value wins the fight, killing his foe. In the event of
a tie, I decided that the defender would win the fight. In most cases, however, since the Greeks primarily
fought in a phalanx, one roll was insufficient. Thus, when the Greeks were in formation, the fight would
have two phases. In the first phase, the Persian soldiers compared their defense roll to the Greek’s attack
roll, illustrating the phalanx’s deadly wall of spears. If the Persian has a lower roll, he is killed and the
simulation iterates to the next Persian. However, if the Persian manages to produce a higher roll, the Greek
is not killed and the Persian moves into the second phase. In this second phase, the Persian produces an
attack roll and the Greek produces a defense roll. Unlike in the previous stage, the soldier with the lower
roll dies.
Together, these two components formed the combat system that generated the results of combat. In
the model, this system was implemented as the primary PROCESS of the combat sequence triggered in the
Daytime EVENT. At the start of the daytime event, the simulation initializes a combat sequence, creating a
new Persian wave and choosing which division of the Greek army is active. Next, the simulation enters a
loop that continues to trigger the fight process until either the Persian wave or Greek division is destroyed.
Each iteration of the loop lasts one simulated minute such that the fight process resolves one minute of
combat at a time. As described above, fight uses a system of rolls to resolve each Persian-Greek interac-
tion individually. Once the process has produced a result for each interaction, it returns the results to the
simulation environment. Here, the simulation data is updated and the next simulated minute begins. The
simulation returns the final results of the battle once the entire population of Greeks or Persians is killed or
the assigned simulation time is reached.
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5 Results
Before I could start simulating counter-factual simulations I had to ensure that my historical model pro-
duced historically accurate data. Thus, the results of the historical simulations needed to fulfill two impor-
tant criteria. First, the model had to faithfully imitate the course of the battle. Since the simulation ends
when the entire population of Greeks or Persians is killed, the simulation of the historical model had to end
during the Greeks’ final stand on the third day. Although I scheduled each of the battle’s EVENTS to occur
precisely in accordance with the historical record, the final stand sequence was scheduled to begin on the
third day and continue until the end of the simulation. In theory, this meant that it was possible for the final
stand sequence to continue into the fourth or fifth day. The second criterion required that the simulation
result in historically accurate death totals. As previously mentioned, however, the death toll is a topic of
debate, with the estimates of Greek deaths ranging from 2,000 to 4,000. Since my historical model does not
account for the populations of helots or the 1,000 Phocians after they are sent to guard the mountain pass,
the target result for Greeks killed is in the range of 1,500 to 2,000.
Table 3: Results of historical simulations.
I ran the historical simulation a total of 50 times (Table 3). With this many trials, I could ensure that
the simulation results were consistent and that the potential margin of error and standard deviation was
low relative to the army population. Over these 50 simulations, the battle consistently concluded on the
third day during the final stand sequence. Furthermore, the average simulated death totals for both the
Greeks and the Persians fell within the estimated range. On average, these simulations resulted in the
death of 1,555.9 Greeks and 20,869.46 Persians. Perhaps more telling of the model’s accuracy, however, is
the standard deviations in the data it produced. Results deviated from the mean death total by an average
of only 14.48 Greeks and 130.32 Persians. To put these values into perspective, the standard deviation from
the average total of Greek deaths represents only .2% of the total population and only .9% of the average
death total. For the Persians, these deviations are representative of only .1% of the total population and .6%
of the average total deaths. In all cases, the model produced standard deviation that represented less than
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1% of the target population. These results show that my model consistently produces accurate historical
data. Thus, I can use the model to accurately simulate “What-If” scenarios with confidence.
5.1 What if Ephialtes never betrayed the Greeks?
At the end of the second day, the Battle of Thermopylae appeared to have no obvious conclusion. However,
Ephialtes’s betrayal of the Greeks led to their untimely demise on the following day. This begs the question
– What if Ephialtes never betrayed the Greeks? Although we cannot say for sure, based on the course of
the battle to that point, it would seem that the battle would have lasted several more days. By removing
Ephialtes’s betrayal from the historical model, the simulation can reveal what the outcome of the battle
might have looked like.
In order to simulate this counter-factual scenario, I had to modify some aspects of the historical model.
First, I removed the Ephialtes’s betrayal sequence from the simulation schedule. This meant that the Greek Re-
treat and Final Stand events never occur, effectively allowing the simulation to run for more than three days.
Next, I added a random strategy component for the Persians. Since, we cannot know how Xerxes would
have strategized the following days, this random strategy generator randomly selected which division of
the Persian army was fighting in a combat sequence. Finally, I added fatigue as a factor. In the historical
model, fatigue only became a factor during the final stand, in accordance with Herodotus’s record, how-
ever, since the battle would presumably last longer than three days, fatigue would become a serious factor
starting on the third day.
Table 4: Results of the counter-factual simulation that removed Ephialtes’s Betrayal as a factor
I ran the modified model through the simulation 50 times (Table 4). Without Ephialtes’s betrayal as a
factor, the battle continued for an average of 17.6 days. Additionally, in each of these 50 simulations, the
Greeks managed to outlast and defeat the Persian army. Compared to the historical simulation results, the
impact of Ephialtes’s betrayal is obvious. Not only did the battle continue for nearly 18 days, but also the
number of Greeks that died in the first three days is exactly 75% fewer than in the historical simulation.
Additionally, the absence of a final stand on the third day results in 87% fewer Greek deaths. The results
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for the Persians remain consistent with the historical simulation during the first two days. On the third
day, however, the standard deviation from the mean total is nearly three and a half times higher than in the
historical simulation.
5.2 What if the battle was not fought during the Carnea Festival?
Next, I considered what impact the timing of the battle had on the outcome. In this scenario, I envisioned
that the battle did not coincide with the Spartan Festival of Carnea which withheld the majority of the Spar-
tan army from fighting in the Battle of Thermopylae. Compared to the previous counter-factual scenario,
this one demanded very few modifications. Starting from the original historical model, I changed the pop-
ulation of Spartans in the Greek army to 10,000 and removed all the other Greek soldiers and, subsequently,
the Greek Retreat caused by Ephialtes’s betrayal. Without making any other modifications to the historical
model, the simulation would illustrate the effect of having the full power of the Spartans fighting at the
Battle of Thermopylae.
Table 5: Results of the counter-factual simulation that removed the Festival of Carnea as a factor.
After running the simulation 50 times, the impact of the Spartan army was consistently obvious (Table
5). Although the Greeks were defeated in each of the 50 trials, the Spartans always survived into the second
day of their final stand. As a result, the battle consistently lasted four days. In the first three days of
the battle, the Spartans consistently outperformed the Greek army of the historical model. In fact, fewer
Spartans died in the first three days of battle than the Greeks on the third day alone. Additionally, the
Spartans killed over twice as many Persians on the third day as the Greeks did in the entire historical
simulation, resulting in the death of roughly 56,244 Persians.
5.3 What if the battle was not fought at the “Middle Gate”?
The final “What-if” scenario that I simulated considered how the location impacted the outcome of the
battle. Leonidas deliberately chose to position his army at a natural bottleneck that was, at most, 15 me-
ters wide. This gave the Greeks a significant defensive advantage that negated the Persians’ strength in
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numbers. However, if the battle had not occurred at Thermopylae or Leonidas chose to defend a different
position on the path, the Greeks would not have benefitted from the advantages of the narrow bottleneck.
In order to model this scenario, I had to make four important modifications. First, I widened the Greeks’
position from 15 meters to 50 meters, which also increased the number of soldiers in a phalanx line from 20
to 55. Since, presumably, this would also suggest a change in location, the secret path through the moun-
tains would not be a factor. Thus I removed the Mountain Defense, Ephialtes’s Betrayal and Final Stand events
from the simulation. Additionally, fighting in a larger space, the Persian army would not be forced to fight
with fewer soldiers. As a result, I gave the Persians the Strength in Number modifier for the entire battle.
Finally, since more than double the number of Greeks would be needed to form the phalanx, soldiers would
not have enough time to rest in between waves and substitutions. Thus, I added fatigue as a factor for the
duration of the battle.
Table 6: Results of the counter-factual simulation that removes the natural 15 meter-wide bottleneck as a
factor.
In each of the 50 trials, the Greek army defeated the Persians in an average of 14.86 days (Table 6).
Though they were able to survive longer outside of the bottleneck, the Greek army experienced nearly twice
as many casualties on the first day. Compared to the results of the first counter-factual scenario, outside the
bottleneck, the Greeks concluded the battle three days faster but, similarly, with twice as many casualties
in the first three days. This is most likely the direct result of increasing the width of the battlefield. With
roughly 110 Persians engaged in combat every minute, compared to 40 in the historical model, the chance
that a Greek was killed was increased by 275%. Additionally, the Strength in Number modifier improved the
odds of a Persian victory by 2 points on the offensive. From this perspective, the number of Greek casualties
is actually relatively low.
5.4 Conclusions
The results of the counter-factual simulations explain the significance of the specific circumstances of the
battle to its historical outcome. When we eliminate Ephialtes’s betrayal and the Greek army’s defensive po-
25
sition at the “Middle Gate” in these simulations, the Greeks triumphed over the Persians. Similarly, when
the timing of the battle does not coincide with the Festival of Carnea, although the Greeks are still defeated,
the superior Spartan army led to drastically increased Persian fatalities. In the absence of Ephialtes’s be-
trayal, the Festival of Carnea, and the Greeks’ defensive position at the “Middle Gate”, the Greek army con-
sistently out performed the historical scenario. Thus, we can conclude that each of these factors negatively
impacted the Greek army’s longevity, contributing to their ultimate defeat at the Battle of Thermopylae.
6 Future Work
Although the results of these counter-factual simulations adequately answered my questions, they also
raised a number of questions that highlight some oversights in the simulation’s implementation. For
starters, I programmed the simulation to continue until either the Greeks or Persians were completely
wiped out. Realistically, however, Xerxes and the Persian army would have retreated long before it got to
this point. Although the absence of this variable does not negatively effect the simulation results, it does
unrealistically indicate the length of these counter-factual battles. The Persians also had a limited amount
of supplies: a factor which would similarly effect their ability to continue fighting after a certain time. In
order to implement these variables into my model, I would have to establish some metric with which I
could determine the effect that limited supplies and deaths would have on the state of the Persian army
and Xerxes’s willingness to keep fighting. Furthermore, the second counter-factual scenario highlights the
important role played by the Festival of Carnea. Although the results revealed the impact that the bat-
tle’s timing had on the outcome, it also raises the question– What if the Greeks resisted the Persians long
enough to receive reinforcements? Historically, this was the Spartan’s intended plan. Therefore, this vari-
able would play a significant role in the other two counter-factual scenarios, which both lasted beyond the
festival’s conclusion.
If I were to continue the project in the future, I would primarily focus on the implementation of these
important variables. With them, the model would produce counter-factual results that had more realistic
depth, allowing the simulation to consider the significance of much smaller details of the battle. Secondly,
I would overhaul certain aspects of the current model that generated inconsistent results: specifically, the
random strategy generator. Eliminating these inconsistencies would reduce the standard deviation of sim-
ulation results, producing more precise data. These improvements would raise my confidence in the accu-
racy of the models results, allowing me to make more significant conclusions about the battle.
26
References
Bivar, Adrian and Mark J. Dresden. “Ancient Iran”. In: Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica,
inc., 2009. URL: https://www.britannica.com/place/ancient-Iran.
Bradford, Ernle. Thermopylae. The Battle for the West. Open Road Media, 2014.
Fields, Nic and Steve Noon. Thermopylae 480 BC: Last Stand of the 300. Campaign. Osprey Publishing, 2007.
Griffin, Arthur and Charles Stanish. “An Agent-based Model of Prehistoric Settlement Patterns and Political
Consolidation in the Lake Titicaca Basin of Peru and Bolivia”. In: Structure and Dynamics: eJournal of
Anthropological and Related Sciences 2.2 (2007), p. 49.
Gutierrez, Diego et al. “AI and virtual crowds: Populating the Colosseum”. In: Journal of Cultural Heritage 8
(2007).
Herodotus. The Histories. Trans. by Tom Holland and Paul Cartledge. New York: Penguin Group, 2014.
Holland, Tom. Persian Fire. The First World Empire and the Battle for the West. Anchor Books, 2005.
Nehmzow, Ulrich. Mobile Robotics. A Practical Introduction. 2nd ed. Springer-Verlag London, 2003.
SimPy Documentation. 3.0.10. Team SimPy. Jan. 17, 2017.
Steffen Thorsen. Time and Date AS. URL: https://www.timeanddate.com/sun/greece/athens.
Stiebing, William H. Uncovering the Past. A History of Archaeology. Oxford University Press, 1994.
Turchin, Peter. “Arise ’cliodynamics’”. In: Nature: International Weekly Journal of Science 454 (2008).
Turchin, Peter et al. “War, space, and the evolution of Old World complex societies”. In: Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 110 (2013).
United States Military Academy, West Point. Atlas for Ancient Warfare: The Battle of Thermopylae. URL: http:
//www.usma.edu/history/SitePages/AncientWarfare.
Unity Documentation. 5.5. Unity Technologies. Oct. 2005.
27
